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Abstract 
The purpose of this research is to examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
value. The component of corporate governance is board size, board independence, number of board 
monitoring committees, risk management committee. Board gender diversity will be introduced in 
this study as a moderator variable between corporate governance and firm value. This study adopts a 
quantitative approach and cross-sectional design. A total of 120 top market capitalization was selected 
for companies listed in Bursa Malaysia and relevant data are extracted from respective companies’ 
annual reports. Result shows that board size and board independence are positively significant to firm 
value. However, board monitoring committee and risk management committee do not show any sig-
nificant relationship with Tobin's Q. Board gender diversity, however, do not function as a moderat-
ing role in the relationship of corporate governance and business performance. This study contributes 
by explaining the relationship between corporate governance and firm value in a developing country. 
Policymakers and academician will be able to have a better insight into the research and this study 
pioneer to test the moderating effect of board gender diversity, and the relationship between risk man-
agement committee and firm value. Further this paper, able to enhance knowledge and understanding 
of relevant authority and help them to strategies new policy or standards for listed company.    
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Introduction   
The breakthrough of corporate governance in Malaysia was the implementa-
tion of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) in March 
2000, and subsequently the introduction of Minority Shareholders Watch-
dog Group (MSWG) in the year 2001. Some of the high-profile collapse of 
companies in Malaysia such as Renong Berhad in 2000, United Engineers 
(Malaysia) Berhad in 2001, and Transmile Group Berhad in 2007 was partly 
attributed by a poor corporate governance practice (Shahansha Molla et al. 
2016). Since then, MCCG was revised twice (before 2017), once in 2007 
and thereafter in 2012. The revisions in 2007 and 2012 of MCCG were 
aimed at improving the accountabilities of the board of directors and audit 
committee. It was also highlighted that the board independence should be 
represented the majority by independent non-executive directors, who are 
financially literate (Johl et al., 2015). Growing concerns from the public to 
strengthen corporate governance for all public listed companies in Malaysia 
were further enforced by the PwC Global Economic Crime Survey 2016 
which showed a high percentage of respondent believes there is asset mis-
appropriation and also accounting fraud in their organization (PwC, 2016). 
On the 26th of April 2017, the Securities Commission of Malaysia (SC) an-
nounced the issuance of the new Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
(MCCG 2017), which will supersede the MCCG 2012. The MCCG 2017 is 
the fourth edition (before this 2000, 2007, and 2012) after taking into con-
text inputs from various stakeholders, corporate governance failures, market 
structures changes, and current market needs. The new MCCG was made 
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applicable to all public listed companies, while non-listed companies are 
encouraged to adapt the code. Public listed companies will no longer be giv-
en the flexibility of merely explaining the reasons for non-compliance, but 
instead they will have to provide alternative steps should the requirements 
were not met under MCCG 2017 (ACCA, 2017). It is proven that corporate 
governance has grown its importance drastically over the past decades espe-
cially firms are often managed by controlling shareholders. The positive re-
lationship between corporate governance and the creation of firm value has 
been widely proven by researchers (Shahansha Molla et al. 2016). Business 
performance and the company's strategic decision making plays an im-
portant role in influencing the firm's value. This has been a general concern 
among stakeholders.  
Despite strong corporate governance guidelines in Malaysia, there 
are still corporate scandals that have caused investors losing their invest-
ments. The case of Felda Global Venture Berhad (FGV) has attracted much 
attention from the authorities. The company's top officials were alleged with 
corruption and abuse of power (Chow, 2017). FGV saw consistent im-
provement in its top line (revenue) since the Initial Public Offering (IPO). 
Despite a stronger revenue generation, FGV failed to translate the revenue 
into their net profit. This is an indicator of poor management, misappropria-
tion of funds, poor decision making, or a combination of all. Over the past 
four years, FGV has seen its net profit fallen drastically from nearly 
RM1,000 million in 2013 to just RM29.6 million in 2016. As a result of 
this, dividend per share paid to the shareholders moved in tandem with the 
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plunge in net profit. The dividend dropped 93% when compared between 
2012 and 2016. Most importantly to investors, FGV saw its Return on Equi-
ty (ROE) dropped to almost 0% in Financial Year 2016 (FY16). Such a sit-
uation will create suspiciousness among investors, and foreign direct inves-
tors tend to shy away from investing in Malaysia for this reason. As a result, 
not only poor governance affects the performance of the company, but also 
the economy of Malaysia indirectly. 
Apart from FGV's corporate scandals, Malaysia had also in the past 
witnessed several other high-profile corporate failures in 1Malaysia Devel-
opment Berhad (1MDB), Port Klang Free Zone (PKFZ), Malaysia Airlines 
(MAS), and Perwaja Steel among others. These collapses gave significant 
evidence that there's a lack of effectiveness in the corporate governance 
mechanism. The board of directors play an important role in determining the 
effectiveness of corporate governance within a company. As such, this study 
is aimed to examine the relationship between board diversity and firm's val-
ue. Despite the continuous effort from the regulatory bodies to enhance the 
corporate governance in Malaysia, the board of directors and manager's 
mismanagement, corruption, and fraud persists. The objective of this re-
search is to address the issue by analysing key corporate governance charac-
teristic's relationship with the value of the firms. The element of corporate 
governance that will be used in this research paper is namely board size, 
board independence, board committees, and risk management committees 
affecting the firm value. Besides, this study also studies the moderating ef-
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fect of board gender diversity in influencing the relationship between corpo-
rate governance and firm value. 
 
Literature Review  
Corporate governance is not new, and its history span back decades 
since the formation of companies. Companies need the adoption of corpo-
rate governance because of the issues of separation of management and 
ownership in the modern corporation. The interest of those who have con-
trol over the firm is not aligned with the interest of the owner/shareholder 
(Padachi et al. 2017). Corporate governance characteristics used in this 
study are namely board size, board independence, board monitoring com-
mittees, and risk management committee. 
Board size can be defined as the total numbers of directors on a 
board (Panasian et al. 2003). Academicians agreed that board size causes a 
coordination problem between its board members, and Jensen (1993) sug-
gested that a board size should be no more than 8 directors. There are also 
arguments between the trade-off of coordination cost and prospective ideas. 
In Malaysia, to promote independence, the board must ideally comprise of 
half independent director, but for large companies, the majority of directors 
should consist of independent director. To maintain the independence of the 
board, the tenure of an independent director must not exceed cumulative of 
nine years (MCCG, 2017).  
The board monitoring committee of audit, remuneration, and nomi-
nation committee has been constantly recommended by corporate govern-
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ance code in many region and countries for the past decades (Pierce, 2004). 
Upadhyay et al. (2014) explained that the importance of board committees 
was because the board is broken into sub-board with a clearly defined man-
date, the accountability for some directors increases, hence solving the free-
rider issues. Risk management and internal control is a substantial tool for a 
company's governance, management, and operations to be effective. Risk 
management takes into consideration the threat and opportunities, while a 
sound internal control will be able to mitigate the threat, while capitalizing 
on the opportunity (Salamzadeh et al., 2019). Companies that can integrate 
effective governance structure and processes with risk management and in-
ternal control at every level of the organization across all operations tend to 
be more successful (MCCG, 2017). 
 
Agency Theory 
The fundamental underlying theory in agency theory is the premise 
of the principal-agent theory. The principal-agent theory is, in fact, a con-
tractual relationship between the two parties, namely the principal and the 
agent. Principal engages the agent to perform a series of services on behalf 
of the principal, of which, strategic decision making is often given to the 
agent (Marie, 2014). A major challenge as highlighted by Monks and Mi-
now (1995) in agency theory concerning corporate governance is striking a 
balance in granting manager the discretionary power to conduct the business 
on behalf of the principal, while at the same time holding them accountable 
to the use of such power. This study will contribute to identifying key cor-
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porate governance characteristic in preventing principal-agency theory that 
affects the firm value. 
 
Stakeholders Theory 
Stakeholders theory was first introduced by Freeman (1984), ex-
plaining how companies should deal with their stakeholders. Stakeholder 
theorist looks at a firm in a much broader perspective, where a firm is made 
up of more than just the shareholders. Another stakeholder theorist, Clark-
son (1994) managed to substantiate a more vibrant understanding of stake-
holder theory and explained the fact that stakeholder theory is important in 
complementing firm in achieving its goals. A firm is a system of stakehold-
ers which operates within a larger system of the host society that provides 
market infrastructure and necessary legal for the firm's activities (Clarkson, 
1994). He further added that the purpose of a firm is to create value and 
wealth for its stakeholder, by creating goods and services from stakes. This 
study was intended to increase awareness of corporate governance in affect-
ing firm value, as stakeholder theorist suggests that the main purpose of 
having a sound corporate governance was to provide a platform in protect-
ing the stakeholder's interest. Under the stakeholder theory, corporate gov-
ernance is termed as "balancing act" because every stakeholder is given the 
rights to be heard (Marie, 2014). 
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Theoretical Framework 
The proposed theoretical framework (Figure 1) for this study is de-
veloped by using Agency Theory and Stakeholder Theory as a base to ex-
plain the importance and relationship between corporate governance charac-
teristic and firm value.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical Framework 
 
The Relationship between Board Size and Firm Value 
Many past studies have proven that there is an inverse relationship 
between the size of a board and several measures of corporate governance 
(Yermack, 1996). The reason why larger size board does not necessarily 
bring benefits to the firm was that a larger board will have difficulty when 
comes to coordination, and problems arise in the sense of communication 
between directors, and organization (Forbes et al., 1999). Other factors be-
ing constant, a larger board size tends to lower the level of corporate liquidi-
ty slack during any event, or crisis (Mcnulty et al. 2012). Larger board tend 
Independent Variables 
H1: Board Size 
H2: Board Independence 
H3: Board Monitoring Committees 
H4: Risk Management Committee 
Dependent Variable 
Firm Value (Measured 
Using Tobins Q) 
Moderating Variable 
H5: Board Gender Diversity 
Control Variable 
Firm Size (Company Assets) 
Profitability (ROA) 
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to be less effective than the smaller board in maintaining sufficient cash, 
resources, or near cash to meet the firm's financial obligation. Larger board 
often faced with communication/coordination and agency problems. For a 
larger group of directors to reach consensus, it takes longer time and effort 
to make the final decision, and often the decision was made with more com-
promise and less extreme than any smaller board (Kogan et al. 1966). As 
Agency problems (director free-riding issue) become more severe with the 
increase of board size, it is easier for the CEO to influence and control the 
board. Jensen (1993) showed that the CEO has higher authority in decision 
making as the board size increases. Jensen (1993) further explained that as 
the board size reaches more than seven or eight directors, the board will 
function less effectively, and it is easier for the CEO to control them. 
There has been an argument in the past studies between board size 
and firm's performance. However, the result of the study was a mix. Yer-
mack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) concluded in their studies that 
firms with smaller boards produce a higher value of Tobin's Q. A study 
conducted in Malaysia by Johl et al. (2015) suggested that there is an exist-
ence of a relationship between the size of the board, and the firm's perfor-
mance. When Meta-analysis technique was used by Dalton et al. (2000), the 
result obtained showed that a larger board was associated with better firm 
financial performance. Large firm size in developing countries showed that 
a bigger board size gives a positive impact to the firm's performance and in 
fact, a larger board size increases the performance of the firm (Malik et al. 
2014). Balanced board size is important to mitigate the risk of identified in 
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agency theory and stakeholder theory; therefore, the suggested hypothesis is 
as follows: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between board size and firm value. 
 
The Relationship between Board Independence and Firm Value 
Prior studies conducted by academician showed mixed result be-
tween the association of independent non-executive directors and firm per-
formance. Dahya et al. (2005) found in their study where investors in the 
United Kingdom tend to view the appointment of the independent director is 
good news and hence reflected in the stock returns. Dahya, et al. (2008) fur-
ther strengthen the finding and proved that board independence showed a 
significant positive relationship to the firm performance, especially for 
companies that are listed in countries where there are lower levels of protec-
tion for the investors. However, Yammeesri et al. (2010) found that firm 
with more executive directors seen a better firm value as compared to a firm 
with a more independent non-executive director. As seen from the previous 
research, there are mixed results from their findings in regard to the rela-
tionship between board independence and firm value (Salamzadeh, 2015). 
Wang (2014) too failed to prove that there is a relationship between board 
independence and firm performance on his study conducted in China. 
Further, Fuzi et al. (2016) stated in their research that there is a posi-
tive relationship between the representations of independent director on 
board concerning firm performance. Liu et al. (2015) managed to prove in 
their study that there is a high degree of a positive and significant relation-
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ship between board independence and firm value. In one of more recent re-
search conducted by Reguera-Alvarado et al. (2017), they found evidence in 
their research that confirmed board independence leads a firm to a better 
performance, which was very much in line with prior research evidence 
found by Bhagat et al. (2013). Independence of the board contributes to a 
lower risk of the agency problem. It was widely understood that increasing 
proportion of independent non-executive directors will increase the value of 
the firm, hence the hypothesis for this variable is: 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between board independence and firm 
value. 
 
The Relationship between Board Monitoring Committee and Firm Value 
Past studies highlighted that the number of board committees as an 
important measurement for firm performance. The firm uses a monitoring 
committee to mitigate the costs associated with a larger board (Upadhyay et 
al. 2014; Goodarzi et al., 2018). Further, Upadhyay et al. (2014) conducted 
the study by using a sample of S&P 1500 firm from 2000 to 2003. In their 
research, they managed to substantiate that not only firms managed to miti-
gate the larger board costs, but firms with more than three board committees 
are also showing that the previous negative association between the board 
size and firm value as measured using Tobin's Q disappeared. The research 
showed that firm with large board size but with more than three monitoring 
committees showed a positive relationship with firm performance and value. 
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Coles et al. (2008) highlighted in their study that a complex firm needs a 
larger board and independent board. Upadhyay et al. (2014) supported the 
finding from Coles et al. (2008) and further elaborated that firm balance up 
the costly need of larger board by organizing them in committees. Brick et 
al. (2010) suggested in their studies that the Tobin's Q value is higher when 
studied on firms when board monitoring is higher.  A study conducted in 
Hong Kong by Leung et al. (2014) showed an important indication where 
there is indeed a significantly positive relationship between board commit-
tees and firm performance but was moderated by the percentage of family 
ownership. With the introduction of more board monitoring committee, this 
study intends to prove that agency problem and issues identified in stake-
holder's theory that affects the firm value will be reduced with improvement 
in finding a balanced number of board monitoring committees. This study 
will be conducted to test the result by Leung et al. (2014) and other prior 
research on the relation between board committees and firm value. The hy-
pothesis for the study will be as follow: 
 
H3: There is a positive relationship between several board committees and 
firm value. 
 
The Relationship between Risk Management Committee and Firm Value 
Over the past, proper risk management was the responsibilities of the 
audit committee (Korosec et al., 2005). Risk management has seen signifi-
cant growth and a new committee specially set up to focus on risk (Subra-
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maniam et al., 2009). The risk management committee is responsible for 
educating enterprise risk management to the member of the board, estab-
lishes risk strategy, and to review risk report (KPMG, 2001; Radovic Mar-
kovic and Salamzadeh, 2012). In line with this, the securities commission 
issued a guideline on the Statement of Internal Control (Guidance for Direc-
tors of Public Listed Companies), in December 2000, but was subsequently 
revised and the current guidelines on the Statement on Risk Management 
and Internal Control was introduced. The intention of the guideline was in-
tending to guide the directors to disclose the firm risk management and in-
ternal control practice in the annual report (Nejati et al., 2011; Ahmad et al., 
2015). Moreover, Subramaniam et al. (2009) stated in the study conducted 
by him that an effective risk management system assists the firm to achieve 
its objective. Yatim (2010) explained that the risk management committee is 
the sub-board and was introduced to reduce the burden of the audit commit-
tee in term of risk management. Apart from managing risk, the risk man-
agement committee is also expected to assist the management in providing 
disclosures to the shareholders.  
Although much past research has been conducted to prove the im-
portance of the risk management committee, there is limited literature in 
studying the relationship between the existence of the risk management 
committee and firm value. Considering risk management committee is act-
ing as a substantial tool for a company's governance, management, and op-
erations to be effective, while considering firm threat and opportunities, and 
advising on sound internal control to mitigate threat, while capitalizing on 
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the opportunity, it is worth considering that risk management committee 
will increase the value of a firm. Proper and working risk management and 
internal control will be able to identify the level of risk and assist the com-
pany in making an informed decision. Hence, the hypothesis for the study 
will be: 
 
H4: There is a positive relationship between risk management committee 
and firm value. 
 
The Moderating Effect of Board Gender Diversity in the Relationship be-
tween Corporate Governance Characteristic (Board Size, Board Inde-
pendence, Board Monitoring Committees and Risk Management Commit-
tee) and Firm Value 
The independent variables introduced in this study showed a mixed 
result from past studies. Board gender diversity has shown a strong relation-
ship between board gender diversity and firm value. In one of the latest re-
searches on literature review for board gender diversity conducted by Velte 
(2017), the result showed that presence of women in the board gives a posi-
tive effect on overall for financial performance. A research conducted by 
Julizaerma et al. (2012) has a strong finding that is a positive association 
between gender diversity and the ROA, which in other words, explains that 
the appointment of women director will give the impact of better financial 
condition to the company. Low et al. (2015) conducted research onboard 
diversity and firm performance in Asian countries: Hong Kong, South Ko-
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rea, Malaysia, and Singapore. In their study, they explained that firms that 
increase the number of female directors on the board tend to have a positive 
effect on firm performance, especially during the first appointment. Due to 
the strong positive relation and its importance in the corporate governance, 
boardroom gender diversity was introduced as a moderating variable, to 
contribute to all prior research on the relation with firm value, considering 
the involvement of all the independent variables in the study. With the in-
troduction of the moderating variable of board gender diversity, it is then 
hypothesized that: 
 
H5a: Board gender diversity moderated the relationship between board size 
and firm value 
H5b: Board gender diversity moderated the relationship between board in-
dependence and firm value 
H5c: Board gender diversity moderated the relationship between the num-
ber of board committees and firm value 
H5d: Board gender diversity moderated the relationship between risk man-
agement committee and firm value. 
 
Research Methodology 
This study applied a quantitative approach, starting from identifying 
the problem and introduce the problem statement. Hypotheses were devel-
oped and examined to obtain the corresponding result based on data collec-
tion and data analysis. This approach, termed as positivism approach by 
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academicians and hypothetical-deductive method is the prevalent method 
which is used by many studies in Malaysia (Bhatt et al., 2017; Zabri et al., 
2016; Johl et al., 2015). This study adopted a cross-sectional design where 
the data gathered are just for one year. Data and information used for this 
study were collected based on the annual report of the respective companies. 
Content analysis was the method selected because data collected provides a 
quantitative or numerical description. The unit analysis of this study is a 
company or generally known as a firm. The population for this study is the 
Public Listed Company listed in Bursa Malaysia. However, financial sectors 
will be excluded in this study because financial companies are subject to 
different requirement, rules and regulations required by the Bank Negara 
Malaysia (Devi et al., 2011). The data required was retrieved from the annu-
al report of top 120 publicly listed companies by market capitalization com-
panies in Bursa Malaysia. 
 
Variables of The Study 
Dependent Variable- Firm Value 
Tobin's Q is often used in the study as a proxy to measure the firm 
value in corporate governance literature (Yermack, 1996). Demsetz et al. 
(2001) stated in their study that a firm can increase the firm value by im-
proving operating performance, or by increasing the present value of future 
investment opportunities. The calculation of Tobin's Q is based on the Total 
Market Value of Firm divided by Total Assets. Many corporate governance 
types of research were conducted using Return over Assets (ROA) or Return 
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on Equity (ROE) as a proxy to firm value. However, these are an accounting 
metric of firm performance (Brick et al., 2010), and not the market value. 
Tobin's Q, a market-based measure for the firm's market value to its book 
value, is used in this study as a proxy to measure firm value instead of ac-
counting metric ratio.  
 
Independent and Moderating Variables 
This study was conducted based on the method adapted from sources 
in the prior study. All data collected and used for this study are empirical 
secondary data extracted from annual reports.  
 
Table 1. Corporate Governance and the Related Literature Support. 
N
o. 
Independent Var-
iables 
Measurement Sources 
1 Board Size The total number of board direc-
tors appointed to the board 
Eisenberg et al. 
(1998); Malik et al. 
(2014); Johl et al. (2015);  
2 Board Independ-
ence 
The proportion of independent 
director will be measured against 
the total number of directors in %. 
Upadhyay et al. (2014); 
Liu et al. (2015); Fuzi et 
al. (2016); Reguera et al. 
(2017) 
3 Board Monitoring 
Committees 
Total numbers of board monitor-
ing committees will be counted as 
a number. 
Leung et al. (2014); 
Upadhyay et al. (2014) 
 
4 Risk Management 
Committee 
Binary variable where "1" indi-
cates companies have risk man-
agement committee and "0" indi-
cates company does not have risk 
management committee 
 Yatim (2010) 
5 Board Gender Di-
versity 
The proportion women director 
will be measured against the total 
number of directors in %. 
Low et al. (2015); Velte 
(2017);  
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Control Variable 
Firm Size 
Studies on firm size affecting the firm performance and value have 
shown a mixed result. Some studies have shown that firm size has a positive 
relationship with firm financial performance and value (Serrasqueiro et al., 
2008). Logically, this is because as the firm size increases, internal fund 
generation and access to external capital market become easier. However, 
some studies show a negative relationship between firm size and financial 
performance. The firm size will be used as a control variable to prevent dis-
tortion of the result of the study. 
 
Profitability 
Fisher (1961) explained in his study that if the Keynesian theory of 
market psychology is accepted, when investors have no information about 
the firm's future, then they will assume the current state of the firm will last 
indefinitely. Dividends are a source of income to investors and it is an indi-
cator of profitability (Fisher, 1961). Fisher (1961) further found that share 
prices are affected by the declared dividend, which is closely related to the 
profitability of the firm. An activity that can affect the dependent variable 
must be controlled (Sanchez, Filho, and Domingos, 2010). The profitability 
of a firm will affect the share price, which affects the firm's market capitali-
zation, hence the profitability (ROA) is used as a control variable. 
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Finding and Discussion 
Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive Analysis was performed using SPSS software (IBM 
SPSS Statistic 20). A descriptive analysis is useful only for data that repre-
sent a continuous variable, which are the Board Size, Board Independence, 
Number of Board Monitoring Committees, and Women Representation in 
the Board. The smallest Board Size was 5 directors, while the highest direc-
tors were 16 directors and the sample have an average of 9 directors. Lowest 
Board of Independence was at 16.67% while a firm with the highest inde-
pendence was 77.78%. As for women representation in the board, some 
firms are not represented by women on the board, while the highest percent-
age of women representation was 57%. The firm value was represented by 
Tobin's Q. Lowest Tobin's Q was 0.22 while the highest firm recorded 
Tobin's Q of 48.54. On average, the Tobin's Q is at 3.35. 
Table 2. Descriptive Analysis 
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Devia-
tion 
Tobin's Q Company .22 48.54 3.35 5.68 
Board Size 5.00 16.00 8.90 2.15 
Independence % 16.67% 77.78% 45.96% 12.02% 
RM Comm* - - - - 
Number of Board Monitoring 
Committees 
1 8 4.06 1.15 
Women % 0.00% 57.14% 16.17% 11.65% 
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*Binary measurement was used 
 
Structural Model Path Coefficient and Coefficient Determination of R2 
The analysis of path coefficient explains the relationship between an 
exogenous and endogenous variable. The result can be in a negative rela-
tionship or a positive relationship. PLS was used to generate the structural 
path coefficient and R square. PLS assumes data collected are in a normal 
distribution nature, hence the application of the nonparametric bootstrap 
procedure is used to test and substantiate the significance of estimated path 
coefficient, with a process of creating a subsample repeated 1000 times for 
the proposed model. 
Table 3. Lateral Collinearity Assessment 
Construct Tobin’s Q (VIF) 
Board Independence 1.310 
Board Size 1.318 
Number of Board Monitoring Committees 1.387 
Risk Management Committee 1.353 
Lateral Collinearity Assessment was conducted to ensure that there 
are no lateral collinearity issues in the structured assessed. Table 3 above 
presents the outcome of lateral collinearity test. All the Inner VIF values for 
independent variables are less than 5, indicating lateral multicollinearity did 
not happen (Hair et al. 2017).  
Table 4. Coefficient of Determination 
Dependent Variable Coefficient of Determination R2 
Business Performance 0.779 
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R-squared (R2) is one of the most common methods in explaining 
the model quality in a proposed model. According to Hair et al. (2017), the 
indicator of 0.25 represents weak, 0.50 for moderate, while anything above 
0.75 being substantial. Table 9 presents the calculated R2 value of Firm 
Value at 0.779, which is substantial according to Hair et al. (2017).  
Table 5. Predictive Relevance 
Dependent Variable Predictive Relevance Q2 
Tobin’s Q 0.604 
Q-squared (Q2) is one of the most common indicative methods in as-
sessing the predictive relevance on how well the values are reconstructed by 
the model and parameter estimates (Chin, 1998). In their research, Hair et, 
al. (2017) explained that any value larger than 0 there is an existence of ex-
ogenous constructs with predictive relevance. For this study, as shown in 
Table 10, Q2 is at 0.604, which is above 0 explains that predictive relevance 
is supported.  
 
Table 6. Hypothesis Testing 
Hy-
pothesis 
Path Path 
Coeffi-
cient 
Stand-
ard 
Error 
t-
val-
ue 
Deci-
sion 
f 
Squar
e 
H1 Board Size → Firm Value 0.143 0.064 2.21
6* 
Sup-
ported 
0.070 
H2 Board Independence → Firm 
Value 
0.122 0.067 1.82
9* 
Sup-
ported 
0.052 
H3 Board Monitoring Comm → 
Firm Value 
-0.036 0.057 0.63
4 
Not 
Sup-
ported 
0.004 
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H4 RM Comm → Firm Value 0.083 0.066 1.26
3 
Not 
Sup-
ported 
0.023 
Note: **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
 
Hypothesis testing was conducted using bootstrapping, where the de-
terminant of t-value greater than 1.645, tested at 0.05 level of significance. 
The result of the analysis shows that H1 is statistically significant at p<0.05 
and positively related with a path coefficient of 0.143 and t-value of 2.216. 
Hence, H1 is supported by the analysis conducted. The result further sup-
ported a recent study conducted in Malaysia by Johl et al. (2015) that there 
is a relationship between board size and firm value. Malik et al. (2014) too 
proved in their study that a larger board size increases the overall perfor-
mance of the firm. Although Lipton et al. (1992) stated in their study that 
bigger board size increases higher agency problem, this study was conduct-
ed with an introduction of firm size and firm performance (ROA) as a con-
trol variable, hence, the negative effect was eliminated.   
Hypothesis 2 (H2) predicted that there is a positive correlation be-
tween Board Independence and Firm Value. The result of the study showed 
a positive relationship with a p<0.05 and positively related at the path coef-
ficient of 0.122 and t-value of 1.829. Hence, H2 is supported in this study. 
This result further supports a recent study conducted by Reguera-Alvarado 
et al. (2017) stating that there is evidence of higher board independence lead 
to better firm value. This study shows that ith higher independence director, 
investors are more comfortable to invest in the firm, which leads to higher 
Tobin's Q. The higher percentage of board independence managed to ad-
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dress the agent-principal issues highlighted in the agency theory and stake-
holder's theory. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3) predicted a positive relationship between Number 
of Board Monitoring Committees and Firm Value. The result showed a path 
coefficient of 0.083, and t-value of just 1.263, hence the hypothesis was not 
supported. Brick et al. (2010) supported that the Tobin's Q value is higher 
when several board monitoring committees are higher. Leung et al. (2014) 
found a positive relationship between several board committees and firm 
value, but Cobetta et al. (2004) suggested that this may not be critical in 
emerging markets. Hence, this report fully supported the claim by Cobetta et 
al. (2014) that numbers of board monitoring committees have a positive re-
lationship with firm value, but not significant in Malaysia's perspective. One 
reason the research result showed a positive relationship, but not significant 
was that out of the 120 companies tested, about 84% of the companies 
skewed and concentrated to have three (3) to five (5) monitoring commit-
tees.  Hypothesis 4 (H4) predicted that there is a positive relationship be-
tween the Risk Management Committee and Firm Value. This study reveals 
that the existence of a risk management committee has a negative path coef-
ficient at -0.036 and t-value of just 0.634, hence the hypothesis is not sup-
ported. The introduction of risk management committee has no significant 
influence on the firm value in Malaysia, although prior research proved that 
a strong risk management system helps the organization to achieve its objec-
tive. Yatim (2010) explained that the risk management committee is the 
sub-board and was introduced to reduce the burden of the audit committee 
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in term of risk management hence, the insignificant relationship could be 
mainly due to the belief that even though a firm might not have a risk man-
agement committee, it has in place a risk management, part of a role under 
audit committee. Meanwhile, the control variable firm size is negatively 
significant to firm value, while company profitability is positively signifi-
cant to firm value.  
Table 7. Hypothesis Testing for Moderating Effect 
Hy-
pothesis 
Path Path 
Coeffi-
cient 
Stand
ard 
Error 
t-
val-
ue 
Deci-
sion 
H5(a) Women Rep*Board Size → Firm Value 0.041 0.451 0.46 Not 
Sup-
ported 
H5(b) Women Rep*Board Independence → 
Firm Value 
0.053 0.623 0.61
3 
Not 
Sup-
ported 
H5(c) Women Rep*Board Monitoring Comm 
→ Firm Value 
-0.038 0.636 0.64 Not 
Sup-
ported 
H5(d) Women Rep*RM Comm → Firm Value 0.045 0.480 0.50
4 
Not 
Sup-
ported 
Note: **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
 
Table 7 shows a summary of the result of moderating effect of board 
gender diversity. Surprisingly, the result showed an insignificant moderating 
effect for all the relationship. Hence, all hypothesis H5(a), H5(b), H5(c), 
and H5(d) are all rejected. The H5(a) was hypothesised to suggest that board 
gender diversity moderate relationship between board size and firm value. 
The result shown above shows that there is no significant moderating effect 
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between board size and firm value. Prior studies had shown a mixed result 
on board size affecting firm value, either negatively or positively. Agency 
theories suggest that the agent of a company tend to have self-interest, hence 
affecting the firm value. With a larger board, the monitoring will be able to 
minimise the risk of agency problems. Women representation in a board, 
however, do not influence the relationship between board size and firm val-
ue. H5(b) was hypothesised to suggest that board gender diversity moderate 
the relationship between board independence and firm value. However, the 
result of the study showed that there is no significant moderating effect of 
board gender diversity between board independence and firm value. Studies 
conducted on board independence and firm value showed mixed result pre-
viously, hence board gender diversity is introduced to moderate the effect. 
Board independence is important integral in a firm value because agency 
theory explained the agent-principal problems. With higher board independ-
ence, the agent will be closely monitored, and contribute to a higher investor 
and stakeholders’ confidence.  
H5(c) was hypothesised to suggest that board gender diversity mod-
erate relationship between board monitoring committee and firm value. The 
result of this study showed that there is no significant moderating effect of 
board gender diversity between board monitoring committee and firm value. 
Prior studies have shown the mixed result on the relationship between board 
monitoring committees and firm value; hence board gender diversity is in-
troduced to moderate the effect. Board monitoring committee, with the 
presence of women director, is crucial in ensuring a true and fair business 
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decision is made taking into account stakeholders and principal, as high-
lighted in agency theory and stakeholder theory. H5(d) was hypothesized to 
suggest that board gender diversity moderate the relationship between risk 
management committee and firm value. A result of this study showed no 
significant moderating effect of board gender diversity between the risk 
management committee and firm value. Research on the risk management 
committee and the firm value was limited as there is no prior study that 
conducted a direct study on the two variables. As mentioned by agency the-
ory, agents are appointed to act on behalf of the principal, but the decision 
must be made at the best interest of the company. Hence with the risk man-
agement committee and the presence of women representative in the com-
pany would provide a stronger risk management system in the firm.  
 
Conclusion 
Companies that have strong corporate governance contributes better 
to the nation's economy and society because these are the companies that 
add value to the shareholders' wealth, employees, public, and countries. 
Good corporate governance allows the company to use their capital more 
efficiently and will build the confidence of investors, hence improving the 
firm value and overall firm performance. Countries with poor governance of 
financial institution will deter foreign direct investments into the country 
and will eventually lead to the future financial crisis (Padachi et al. 2017). 
This study was conducted to substantiate the relationship between corporate 
governance characteristics, namely board size, board independence, board 
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monitoring committees and risk management committee with firm value. 
The moderating effect of board gender diversity was introduced to the study 
to further understand the moderating effect between corporate governance 
characteristic and firm value. The sample selected for the study is 120 top 
market capitalization companies as of 31 December 2016, and the reason 
top companies selected was due to its impact to the community and country 
in the event of corporate failure.  
Four independent variables (board size, board independence, board 
monitoring committee, and risk management committee), one dependent 
variable (Tobin's Q) and one moderator (board gender diversity) were tested 
using PLS. The result showed that board size and board independence have 
a significant relationship with Firm Value. Agency theories suggest that the 
agent of a company tend to have self-interest, hence affecting the firm val-
ue. With a larger board, the monitoring will be able to minimize the risk of 
agency problems, while a higher board independence will also help to have 
the agent closely monitored, hence contributing to a higher investor and 
stakeholders’ confidence which explains a stronger Tobin's Q. Board moni-
toring committees and risk management committees did not show a signifi-
cant relationship in this study. This could be due to public perception in Ma-
laysia that the existence of board members are will provide sufficient moni-
toring. It could also be due to lack of exposure towards the different num-
bers of board monitoring committees and its function. This study contributes 
to the literature of agency theory, stakeholder theory and corporate govern-
ance towards firm value as well as the findings of this study will be benefi-
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cial to all policymakers. From the study, it is shown that most of the compa-
nies are still behind the required standards of having at least 30% women. 
Theoretical Implication  
The study conducted in this research substantiated the relationship 
between part of corporate governance attributes, namely Board Size, Board 
Independence, Board Committees, and Risk Management Committees with 
Firm Value, with an introduction of Firm Size and ROA as a control varia-
ble. The result of this study assists in further strengthening the literature of 
corporate governance characteristic and firm value for Malaysia, represent-
ed by the top 120 market capitalisation sample. The result clearly showed 
strong significance where board size and board independence significantly 
correlated to firm value. Monks et al. (1995) explained the importance of 
corporate governance in agency theory in striking a balance in granting 
managers the authority to conduct business, while at the same time holding 
them responsible. The implementation of corporate governance is to gain 
investor's confidence. With agent-principal problems, investors and other 
stakeholders (stakeholder theory) are more sceptical when investing in the 
firm. This is why, with the implementation of corporate governance, the 
firm value should show a positive reaction due to the level of confidence.  
 
Practical Implication 
The practicability of this research contributed to a better understand-
ing of the effect of corporate governance characteristic on firm value. This 
study shows that board size and board independence significantly related to 
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firm value. With the introduction of MCCG (2017), there is a requirement 
of having at least 30% women representation in the board, but this study 
showed that as of the financial year 2016, only 13% of total 120 firms se-
lected has more than 30% women director. The MCCG board needs to be 
aware that the requirement of 30% is still far from achievable. Securities 
Commission of Malaysia will benefit from this study as this study gives 
them an indicator that the listed companies in Malaysia are yet to be ready 
for this. On top of this, MCCG too set a guideline of having at least 50% 
independence director in the board. The samples of 120 companies selected 
for this study shows that about 42% of the companies have less than 50% 
independence, which shows that the companies failed to comply with the 
recommendation by MCCG. This study showed that Board Gender Diversi-
ty does not moderate the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm value in Malaysia but it does not imply that women representation in 
the board is not significant to firm value. A prior study conducted by Low et 
al. (2015) on board diversity and firm performance in Asian countries: Hong 
Kong, South Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore showed that firms that in-
crease the number of female directors on the board tend to have a positive 
effect on firm performance. With the importance of corporate governance 
gaining its momentum even in developing countries like Malaysia, this 
study can be used as a reference for future research by Malaysia Institute of 
Accountants, Association of Chartered Certified Accountants and other pro-
fessional bodies. This study may be used as a support for future research in 
identifying a crucial element of corporate governance characteristic in im-
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proving firm value. The growing numbers of corporate governance failure in 
Malaysia have grown significantly, with the case of Felda Global Ventures, 
1MDB, Tabung Haji, among others. These are high profile corporate failure 
and it affects the economy of Malaysia. 
 
Limitation of The Study and Recommendation for Future Study 
The sample collected in this study was just 120 companies and is not 
controlled by industry. Hence it is hard to use the 120 top market capitaliza-
tion companies to generalize all listed companies in Malaysia. This study 
was also conducted by collecting just 1 year of data from the selected com-
panies. Hence the data representation might not represent a series of time. 
Future research can be done for unlisted companies as well. It is understood 
that unlisted companies are harder to obtain data, but the method of inter-
viewing will work. This is because, for unlisted company, there is also mi-
nority interest that has no control over the company that they invested in. It 
is also recommended that future research can be conducted by using time 
series research, a mean of collecting data from a series of years. 
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